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I. Introduction 
This Article discusses the benefits and costs of bid 
protests, which are legal challenges brought by bidders against 
the way the Government has conducted its procurements.1  In the 
U.S. federal procurement system, bid protests have existed since 
the 1920s.2  Despite its longevity, however, critics have come to 
characterize the bid protest process as costly and overly 
complex.3  This Article explains why, in the author’s view, the 
benefits of the bid protest system substantially outweigh the 
burdens it imposes on the procurement system. 
II. The Administrative and Judicial Venues for Filing Bid 
Protests in the U.S. Federal System 
In 1924, a few companies began writing to the then 
relatively new General Accounting Office (GAO)4 to complain that 
agencies had improperly awarded contracts to their competitors.5  
                                                          
1 See FAR 33.101. 
2 Daniel I. Gordon, In the Beginning: The Earliest Bid Protests 
Filed with the US General Accounting Office, 13 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. 
REV., NA147, at NA147 (2004) [hereinafter In the Beginning]. 
3 See William E. Kovacic, Procurement Reform and the Choice of 
Forum in Bid Protest Disputes, 9 ADMIN. L. REV. AM. U. 461, 461, 
491 (1995). 
4 Today’s Government Accountability Office was founded in 1921 as 
the General Accounting Office.  See Budget and Accounting Act, 
1921, Pub. L. No. 67-13, § 301, 42 Stat. 20, 23.  Effective July 
7, 2004, the General Accounting Office’s legal name became the 
Government Accountability Office.  See GAO Human Capital Reform 
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-271, § 8(a), 118 Stat. 811, 814.  
The name change did not alter the acronym “GAO.”  
5 See In the Beginning, supra note 2, at NA154-62. 
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There was hesitation within the GAO about the appropriateness of 
considering complaints by private firms about the federal 
procurement process.6  Ultimately, the GAO decided to consider 
the complaints as part of its responsibility to ensure that 
funds appropriated by Congress are lawfully spent, which is also 
known as the Office’s account settlement function.7   
Then in 1925, a company wrote to the GAO alleging that 
Panama Canal officials had issued a solicitation with 
specifications for a truck that were “wired” to a particular 
brand name and that thereby unfairly precluded the complaining 
firm from fair consideration for the contract.8  The GAO 
requested the agency’s views on the matter, and, when the Canal 
authorities admitted that they had used the specifications of 
one company’s truck in the solicitation,9 the GAO issued the 
first published bid protest decision, ruling that the challenged 
solicitation was unlawful.10 
In the course of the ensuing decades, handling bid protests 
became a routine function of the GAO’s Office of General 
                                                          
6 See id. at NA147; Daniel I. Gordon, Annals of Accountability: 
The First Published Bid Protest Decision, 39 PROCUREMENT LAW., 
Winter 2004, at 11. 
7 In the Beginning, supra note 2, at NA148. 
8 Id. at 157-58. 
9 Id. at 160-62. 
10 Letter to the Gov., the Panama Canal, 5 Comp. Gen. 712, 713 
(1926). 
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Counsel.11  Some protests involved potential offerors’ pre-award 
challenges to solicitation terms,12 while others represented 
post-award challenges in which firms that had competed for a 
contract contested the award to another offeror.13 
For many years, courts did not consider bid protests, so 
that the GAO (and the contracting agencies themselves) 
represented the only place to file a protest.14  Then, for three 
decades U.S. district courts had bid protest jurisdiction, 
beginning with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit’s decision in Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. 
Shaffer15 and ending with the statutory mandate of the 
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 that this 
jurisdiction “sunset” in 2001.16   
                                                          
11 See Kovacic, supra note 3, at 470.  
12 See, e.g., Letter to Sec’y of War, 16 Comp. Gen. 149, 150 
(1936). 
13 See, e.g., Letter to Sec’y of Interior, 17 Comp. Gen. 770 
(1938). 
14 See Robert S. Metzger & Daniel A. Lyons, A Critical 
Reassessment of the GAO Bid-Protest Mechanism, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 
1225, 1229 (2007). 
15 424 F.2d 859, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding that bid protests 
could be heard in U.S. district courts). 
16 Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-320, § 12(d), 110 Stat. 3870, 3874-75 (codified as 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 571-584 (2000)) (providing for district court jurisdiction 
over bid protests to “sunset” on January 1, 2001). 
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Meanwhile, from the enactment of the Competition in 
Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA)17 until its jurisdiction ended 
pursuant to section 5101 of the Clinger Cohen Act of 1996,18 
there was another administrative forum with jurisdiction over 
bid protests that pertained to information technology:  the 
General Services Administration’s Board of Contract Appeals.19  
Finally, a statutory change in 1996 resulted in the Court of 
Federal Claims,20 which had only pre-award protest jurisdiction 
for many years, gaining post-award jurisdiction as well.21   
Consequently, for more than a decade now, the only places 
outside the contracting agency where disappointed bidders have 
been able to file protests have been the GAO and the Court of 
Federal Claims.  From time to time there are differences between 
the GAO and the Court of Federal Claims, with respect to both 
                                                          
17 Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 
Stat. 1175, 1182 (1984) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2304 
(2006 & Supp. IV 2010) and 41 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (Supp. IV 
2010)).  
18 Clinger Cohen Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 5101, 110 
Stat. 186, 680. 
19 The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) both created an 
explicit statutory basis for the GAO’s bid protest jurisdiction 
and gave the General Services Administration’s Board of Contract 
Appeals its limited bid protest authority.  Id. § 2741.  
20 The Court of Federal Claims was previously called the United 
States Claims Court, prior to Congress’s enactment of the 
Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992. Pub. L. No. 102-572, 
§ 902, 106 Stat. 4506, 4516. 
21 Administrative Dispute Resolution Act § 12.  
 7 
 
process and outcome.22  The author views occasional differences 
between the two fora as inevitable.  That is particularly the 
case where, as here, one forum is administrative and the other 
is judicial.  In any event, having two fora hear bid protests 
may be healthy for the procurement system.  While the discussion 
below regarding the costs and benefits of protests to the 
procurement system is focused on the GAO, the analysis should 
apply, at least in broad terms, to the Court of Federal Claims 
as well. 
III. Spread of the Protest Process Outside the U.S. 
Before turning to that analysis, it is worth looking 
outside the United States, because the protest process has 
received substantial attention around the world in recent 
years.23  More than ever, a protest system has come to be seen as 
a required part of a good public procurement regime.24  As 
                                                          
22 JOHN CIBINIC, JR. ET AL., FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 1673, 1674 
(2011). 
23 See Erik A. Troff, The United States Agency-Level Bid Protest 
Mechanism: A Model for Bid Challenge Procedures in Developing 
Nations, 57 A.F. L. REV. 113, 115-16 (2005) (describing bid 
protest mechanisms required by major public procurement 
development efforts); see, e.g., David P. Goodwin et al., 
International Procurement, 44 INT’L LAW. 261, 262-64 (2010) 
(discussing local protest procedures in Canada). 
24 See Troff, supra note 23, at 115-16, 116 n.6 (noting the 
international emphasis placed on bid protest mechanisms).  It 
should be noted that the term “protest” (or “bid protest”) is 
rarely used outside the United States; instead, what we would 
call protests are called “challenges,” “domestic review 
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evidence of this trend, the U.S. includes a bid protest 
provision in the free trade agreements it negotiates.25  For 
example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
requires each partner to have a protest forum.26  The World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) 
likewise includes a provision requiring that WTO members that 
accede to the GPA have a forum to hear protests (called a 
domestic review procedure).27  Finally, there is a protest 
provision in Chapter VIII of the model procurement law of the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL).28 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
procedures,” “remedies,” or simply ”complaints.”  Id. at 115 
n.5. 
25 Timothy M. Cox, Should the United States Incorporate the 
Procurement Integrity Act Into Its Free Trade Agreements?: A 
Look At the Australian-United States Free Trade Agreement, 17 SW. 
J. INT’L LAW 101, 113 (2010) (noting that all free trade 
agreements with the United States require some type of bid 
protest mechanism); see generally Free Trade Agreements, OFF. OF 
THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited Feb. 15, 2013) 
(listing all United States Free Trade Agreements in force). 
26 North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1017, Dec. 17, 1992, 
107 Stat. 2066, 32 I.L.M. 296 (1993) (entered into force Jan. 1, 
1994). 
27 See Agreement on Government Procurement, Committee on 
Government Procurement, Adoption Of The Results Of The 
Negotiations Under Article XXIV:7 Of The Agreement On Government 
Procurement, Apr. 2, 2012, WT/GPA/113, available at  
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/GPA%20113%20Decision%20o
n%20the%20outcomes%20of%20the%20negotiations%20under%20Article%2
0XXIV%207.pdf. 
28 See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON PUB. PROCUREMENT Ch. VIII (United Nations 
Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 2011), available at 
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Perhaps most interesting is the attention bid protests have 
received during the past twenty years in the European Union 
(EU).  Not mentioned in the EU’s Public Procurement Directives, 
protests were first addressed by the European Commission in what 
is known as the Remedies Directive.29  Initially issued in 1989,30 
the Remedies Directive was revised in 2007.31  The Remedies 
Directive has had an enormous impact, requiring all member 
states to have a forum that considers protests.32  Furthermore, 
the Court of Justice of the European Union has also issued 
decisions that have reshaped the protest process in the EU.33  Of 
particular importance was the Alcatel decision34 that led to the 
requirement (codified in Article 2a of the 2007 revision to the 
Remedies Directive) that there be a “standstill” period 
(typically ten days) between the announcement of a potential 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/ml-
procurement-2011/ML_Public_Procurement_A_66_17_E.pdf.  
29 See Council Directive 89/665/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 2 (EC). 
30 Id. 
31 See Directive 2007/66/EC, of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council Directives 
89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC With Regard to Improving the 
Effectiveness of Review Procedures Concerning the Award of 
Public Contracts 2007 O.J. (L 335) 31. 
32 See id. at 35.  
33 See, e.g., Case C-81/98, Alcatel Austria AG v. 
Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft und Verkehr, 1999 E.C.R. I-
7671 (1998). 
34 Id. 
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awardee and contract signing to allow a window for filing 
protests.35 
Bid protest procedures have therefore received important 
consideration from the international community.  States-side, 
however, the U.S. federal protest system has sometimes come 
under criticism.36  The following section addresses some of the 
misconceptions upon which much of this criticism is based. 
IV. Correcting Misperceptions about Bid Protest Statistics 
In the author’s experience, there exist a number of 
misperceptions concerning bid protest statistics that deserve 
attention, because these misperceptions can taint judgments 
about the benefits and costs of protests.  In particular, even 
people quite familiar with the federal acquisition system often 
believe that protests are more common than they really are, and 
they believe, inaccurately, that protesters use the protest 
process as a business tactic to obtain contracts from the 
Government.37 
                                                          
35 Directive 2007/66/EC, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council Directives 
89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC With Regard to Improving the 
Effectiveness of Review Procedures Concerning the Award of 
Public Contracts 2007 O.J. (L 335) 37; Sue Arrowsmith, The Past 
and Future Evolution of EC Procurement Law: From Framework to 
Common Code?, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 337, 378 (2006).  
36 See Kovacic, supra note 3, at 462.  
37 See, e.g., MOSHE SCHWARTZ & KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R40227, GAO BID PROTESTS: TRENDS, ANALYSIS, AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 1 
(2009) ("Bid protests filed with the [GAO] have recently 
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A. Protests Are Rare Events   
The frequency of protests requires context in order for any 
judgment on the issue to be sensible.  In the author’s 
experience, when a Contracting Officer is asked whether, in the 
procurements she or he has worked on over the prior few years, 
protests were frequent, an affirmative answer is often provided; 
but if one asks how many procurements the Contracting Officer 
has worked on during that period, that number often dwarfs the 
number of protests.  Put another way, while the numerator (the 
absolute number of protests) is important, the denominator (the 
total number of procurements) is critical to determining whether 
it is reasonable to say that protests frequently occur.  In 
assessing the frequency of bid protests in the federal 
procurement system, there are difficulties with both the 
denominator (the number of federal procurements that occur each 
year) and the numerator (the number of protests filed each 
year).   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
received increased congressional scrutiny due to recent protests 
of high-profile awards and reports that the number of protests 
is increasing."); Nick Wakeman, Bid Protest Dilemma Continues, 
WASH. TECH. (Nov. 16, 2012), 
http://washingtontechnology.com/blogs/editors-
notebook/2012/11/bid-protest-dilemma.aspx (“My feelings are 
mixed because I believe there are too many bid protests. I’ve 
heard plenty of comments from industry people who say bid 
protests are a common tactic by losing incumbents to extend 
their work on a contract because the transition to the winner is 
delayed while the protest winds its way through the process.”).  
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Regarding the denominator, perhaps surprisingly, there are 
no good statistics on the number of federal procurements.38  Any 
such count would need to include, not only the number of 
contracts awarded each year, but also any protestable task and 
delivery orders awarded.39  The latter category includes all 
orders placed under the General Services Administration (GSA) 
Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) and orders issued under multiple-
award indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity (ID/IQ) 
contracts, where the orders have a value above $10 million.40   
                                                          
38 One such study, on federal procurement statistics, was 
conducted by the RAND Corporation.  See THOMAS LIGHT ET AL., RAND 
PROJECT AIR FORCE, ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT OF ACCOUNTABILITY BID PROTESTS IN AIR 
FORCE SOURCE SELECTIONS OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES 12 (2012), available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2012
/RAND_TR883.pdf.  As explained in greater detail later in this 
Article, the author believes that the RAND Corporation study’s 
estimate of annual procurements made by the Air Force may 
represent a significant underestimation.  See infra note 41 and 
accompanying text. 
39 See generally supra note 22, at 1678 (discussing protestable 
task and delivery orders).  
40 The Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) amended the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) 
to grant GAO jurisdiction, for three years, to hear protests 
concerning task or delivery orders valued at more than $10 
million.  See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 843, 122 Stat. 3, 237-39 (codified 
as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 4106(f) (Supp. IV 2010)); Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 
Stat. 3243, 3252-53, 3264.  The FY 2011 NDAA included a 
provision that extended, to September 30, 2016, the GAO’s 
jurisdiction to hear protests concerning the issuance of a task 
or delivery order under Title 10 of U.S. Code (which essentially 
covers defense agencies).  Ike Skelton National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 
825, 124 Stat. 4137, 4270 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2304c (e) 
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A recent RAND Corporation study of Air Force procurements 
that were protested to the GAO indicated that approximately 
20,000 contracts with at least one transaction over $25,000 were 
awarded by the Air Force in 2008, representing approximately $63 
billion.41  Since overall procurement spending in 2008 was over 
$500 billion42 (eight times the amount spent by the Air Force 
alone), that would suggest that the overall number of contracts 
awarded was approximately 160,000.  The author suspects that the 
number is low and that a better estimate, including FSS orders 
and ID/IQ orders above $10 million, would probably substantially 
exceed 250,000.43  For the purpose of this Article’s analysis, 
however, it will be assumed that the total number of federal 
contracts and protestable orders awarded in a year is 200,000. 
With respect to the numerator (the number of protests 
filed), there has been confusion due to a methodological anomaly 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(Supp. V 2011)).  The FY 2012 NDAA did the same thing for 
agencies covered by Title 41 of the U.S. Code (which essentially 
covers civilian agencies).  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 813, 125 Stat. 1298, 
1491 (2011) (codified at 41 U.S.C. 4106(f) (Supp. V. 2011)).    
41 LIGHT ET AL., supra note 38, at 12.  It is not clear if RAND’s 
analysis took into account task and delivery orders, but the 
reference to “contracts” suggests that it did not.  See id.  
42 Prime Award Spending Data: FY 2008, USASPENDING.GOV (Nov. 23, 
2012), 
http://usaspending.gov/?q=explore&fromfiscal=yes&typeofview=deta
ilsummary&fiscal_year=2008. 
43 This estimate is based on the author’s experience, including 
familiarity with the use of the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) 
and indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity (ID/IQ) contracts. 
 14 
 
at the GAO that is worth explaining.  Since the days when 
protest filings were tracked on 3” x 5” cards, the GAO has 
counted cases in a manner that can cause people to believe that 
protest numbers are higher than they actually are.44  When a 
company files a protest challenging the terms of a solicitation, 
the GAO assigns it a docket number, referred to as a “B number,” 
because it begins with a “B” (for example, B-123456).45  If the 
protester later learns new information that constitutes a new 
ground of protest and files a supplemental protest of that same 
solicitation’s terms, the GAO will docket that as B-123456.2.46  
If another potential offeror also protests the solicitation’s 
terms, the GAO will docket that other offeror’s initial protest 
as B-123456.3 and its supplemental protest (if filed) as B-
123456.4.47  However those pre-award protests are resolved, once 
the agency awards a contract, a losing competitor may file a 
protest, which the GAO will docket as B-123456.5; if there is a 
supplemental protest once the protester sees the agency report, 
                                                          
44 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-401197, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS 5-6 n.8 (2009) [hereinafter 
BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS] (describing the discrepancy 
between the number of protests that the GAO reports as filed, 
and the number of procurements that are actually protested). 
45 Id.  The way “B numbers” are assigned and counted, and the 
resulting overstating of protest numbers, appears to be unique 
to the GAO and thus would not affect statistics at the Court of 
Federal Claims.  See id. 
46 See id. 
47 See id. 
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it will be docketed as B-123456.6.48  And finally, if another 
losing competitor files a protest and then supplements it, those 
protests will be docketed as B-123456.7 and B-123456.8, 
respectively.49  Overall, the GAO’s statistics will indicate 
eight protests, even though only one procurement has been 
protested.50  In the author’s experience, eight protests of one 
procurement would be unusual, whereas two or three protests of 
one procurement would be more routine. 
This practice suggests that when the GAO reports the number 
of protests filed in a year, the reported number substantially 
overstates the number of procurements actually protested.  For 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, for example, while the GAO reported 1,652 
cases were filed,51 elsewhere the GAO reported that 1,027 
procurements were protested in that period.52  In other words, 
                                                          
48 See id.  
49 See id. 
50 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-251R, GAO’S BID PROTEST 
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 2 n.1 (2008) 
[hereinafter GAO FY 2008 BID PROTEST REPORT]. 
51  Id. at 2.  The number of cases filed as reported in the GAO’s 
annual reports also includes requests for reconsideration of a 
prior GAO decision as well as requests for reimbursement of 
costs.  See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-162SP, 
GAO’S BID PROTEST ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 1 
(2012) [hereinafter GAO FY 2012 BID PROTEST REPORT]. 
52 See BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS, supra note 44, at 7. 
This figure is derived from adding 416 non-Department of Defense 
(DoD) protests and 611 DoD protests.  Additionally, the report 
explains, “[F]or purposes of counting the number of protests 
filed, we eliminated from our count multiple iterations of the 
same ‘B’ number.  As a consequence, the number of protests in 
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the GAO indicated that, on average, there were approximately 1.6 
docket numbers assigned (“cases filed”) per protested 
procurement.53  Assuming that this ratio is stable over time, it 
would mean that the 2,353 cases filed in FY 201154 represented 
approximately 1,470 protested procurements.  While the number of 
federal procurements was probably not the same in FY 2008 and FY 
2011, if we nevertheless assume, for the sake of simplicity and 
because this is only a rough estimate, that there were 200,000 
procurements in each of those two years, that would suggest that 
0.51% of procurements were protested in FY 2008 and 0.74% were 
protested in FY 2011.55  In other words, between approximately 
99.3% and 99.5% of procurements were not protested.56 
This calculation is supported by the recent RAND 
Corporation study mentioned above.57  In that study, researchers 
at the RAND Corporation found that, in the Air Force, “[t]he 
number of [GAO] protests as a percentage of total contract 
awards has fallen fairly steadily from about 1.7[%] in FY 1995 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
this report reflects the number of procurements challenged in a 
given fiscal year.”  Id. at 5-6 n.8. 
53 See id. at 7; GAO FY 2008 BID PROTEST REPORT, supra note 50, at 2. 
54 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-199SP, GAO’S BID PROTEST 
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 4 (2011) [hereinafter 
GAO FY 2011 BID PROTEST REPORT]. 
55 See id.; GAO FY 2008 BID PROTEST REPORT, supra note 50, at 2. 
56 See GAO FY 2008 BID PROTEST REPORT, supra note 50, at 2; GAO FY 
2011 BID PROTEST REPORT, supra note 54, at 4. 
57 LIGHT ET AL., supra note 38, at 1. 
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to 0.5[%] in FY 2008.”58  That is to say, as of 2008, 99.5% of 
Air Force procurements went forward without being protested to 
the GAO.59  Even if the GAO protests for some other agencies’ 
procurements were twice as common as for the Air Force (and 
there is no reason to assume that that is the case), it would 
still be true that 99% of these other agencies’ procurements 
went forward without being protested to the GAO. 
While the RAND Corporation study refers to GAO protests, 
including the Court of Federal Claims would not alter the 
picture, since the court receives fewer than one-tenth the 
number of protests each year that the GAO receives.60  And while 
protesters can file protests within the Air Force, and 
notwithstanding that statistics on the number of those “agency-
level protests” are not available,61 there is no reason to 
believe that they would increase the total percentage of 
protested Air Force procurements much above 0.5%.62 
                                                          
58 Id.  
59 See id. 
60 See Michael J. Schaengold et al., Choice of Forum for Federal 
Government Contract Bid Protests, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 243, 255-59 
(2009) (noting the number of protests filed at GAO and the Court 
of Federal Claims in each year from 2001 to 2007).  For example, 
in FY 2008 1,652 bid protests were filed at the GAO.  Id. at 
255.  In the same year, only 85 had been filed with the Court of 
Federal Claims (CoFC).  Id. at 259. 
61 See id. at 254-55; Troff, supra note 23, at 146 n.170. 
62 See LIGHT ET AL., supra note 38, at 1. 
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It is, of course, true that very high-dollar procurements 
are much more likely to be protested: the higher the dollar 
value, the greater the likelihood of a protest.63  For a company 
that loses the competition for a $100 million contract, with all 
the bid and proposal costs that competing entails, the 
additional cost of filing a protest may seem minimal, so that 
filing a protest can be very tempting.  That does not change the 
overall picture, however, that bid protests are rare. 
What about the mantra we often hear about increases in 
protest numbers?  It is true that the GAO has reported a 
substantial increase in the number of cases filed over the past 
few years,64 but even if the numbers doubled, from .5% of 
procurements to 1%, it would still mean that something like 99% 
of procurements are not protested.  In terms of absolute 
numbers, the GAO has reported that the number of cases rose from 
1,327 in FY 2006 to 2,353 in FY 2011, an increase of more than 
70%.65  Adjusted to eliminate the overcounting explained above,66 
                                                          
63 See Memorandum from Daniel I. Gordon, Adm’r for Fed. 
Procurement Policy, Office of Fed. Procurement Policy, to Chief 
Acquisition Officers, Senior Procurement Execs., & Chief Info. 
Officers 7 (Feb. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Myth-Busting].  
64 See, e.g., GAO FY 2011 BID PROTEST REPORT, supra note 54, at 4. 
65 Compare GAO FY 2008 BID PROTEST REPORT, supra note 50, at 2 
(noting that 1,327 bid protests were filed in FY 2006), with GAO 
FY 2011 BID PROTEST REPORT, supra note 54, at 4 (noting that 2,353 
bid protests were filed in FY 2011).  It may be worth keeping in 
mind that the number of cases filed at the GAO was higher in the 
1990s.  For example, the GAO reported 2,529 cases in FY 1995 and 
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that would represent an increase from approximately 830 to 
approximately 1,470 protested procurements (representing the 
same percentage increase).67  During that same period, however, 
federal procurement spending has increased from $432 billion in 
FY 2006 to $537 billion in FY 2011.68  Put another way, in FY 
2006, there were approximately 1.92 protests for each billion in 
federal procurement spending, while in FY 2011, there were 2.74 
protests per billion.69  Those figures are similar to the ones 
that the GAO provided in a congressional report in 2009, when it 
stated that the number of protested procurements per billion 
dollars in Department of Defense contract spending ranged from 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2,286 in FY 1996.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-158766, GAO’S 
BID PROTEST ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995 1 (1996); see 
also BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS, supra note 44, at 7. 
66 See BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS, supra note 44, at 5-6 
n.8. 
67 These figures are derived by dividing the figures reported by 
the GAO, see supra note 65, by 1.6.  The figures therefore take 
into account the 1.6 docket numbers assigned per protested 
procurement.  See BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS, supra note 
44, at 7. 
68 Compare Prime Award Spending Data: FY 2006, USASPENDING.GOV 
(Nov. 23, 2012), 
http://usaspending.gov/?q=explore&fromfiscal=yes&typeofview=deta
ilsummary&fiscal_year=2006, with Prime Award Spending Data: FY 
2011, USASPENDING.gov (Nov. 23, 2012),  
http://usaspending.gov/?q=explore&fromfiscal=yes&typeofview=deta
ilsummary&fiscal_year=2011. 
69 These figures are derived by dividing the number of total 
protests, see supra note 67 and accompanying text, by the total 
number of dollars spent on federal procurements for each 
respective year, see supra note 68.  
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1.4 to 1.9 during the period FY 2004 to FY 2008.70  While the FY 
2011 figure reflects an increase, the number of protests for 
each billion in federal procurement spending is still extremely 
low: fewer than three protests for each billion dollars that the 
Government spends on contracts. 
B. It is Rare for a Protester to Win a Protest, and Even 
Rarer for a Winning Protester to go on to Obtain the 
Contract at Issue in the Protest 
Here again, the GAO’s methodology risks misleading 
observers.  The GAO reports a “sustain” rate (that is, the rate 
at which the GAO rules in favor of the protester and sustains 
the protest) that has ranged, between 2007 and 2011, from 16% to 
27%.71  That sounds like protesters do fairly well, but the full 
picture is not so favorable to protesters.  First, the sustain 
rate has been dropping nearly consistently, falling from 27% in 
FY 2007 to 16% in FY 2011.72  Second, the sustain rate is 
calculated only among the cases for which the GAO issues a 
                                                          
70 BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS, supra note 44, at 9.    
71 RALPH O. WHITE, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-520SP, GAO 
BID PROTEST OVERVIEW 2 (2011) [hereinafter GAO BID PROTEST OVERVIEW]. 
72 Id.  While the GAO’s report on FY 2012 protests indicates a 
higher sustain rate of 18.6%, it also acknowledges that many of 
the sustained protests (18 of the 106 reported sustains) related 
to one small-business issue, which led to protests by one small 
business raising that one issue accounting for 15 of the 
sustained protests (including 8 of them in one 2.5 page 
decision).  See GAO FY 2012 BID PROTEST REPORT, supra note 51, at 1, 
5; Aldevra, B-406774 et al., 2012 CPD ¶ 240 (Comp. Gen. Aug. 21, 
2012).  If those carbon-copy cases are treated as one, the 
sustain rate for FY 2012 falls back to approximately 16%, even 
without regard to the double-counting of B numbers. 
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decision on the merits, as the GAO’s annual reports 
demonstrate.73  That means that, in FY 2010, for example, the GAO 
did not sustain 19% of 2,299 cases; rather, it sustained 19% of 
441 decisions on the merits (the 441 figure being based on the 
GAO’s protest overview report of 2011).74  Third, that percentage 
is distorted by the methodology of counting multiple B numbers 
separately because, in the author’s experience, protests that 
are sustained typically have more B numbers than protests that 
are denied.75  For example, in FY 2010, the GAO reported 441 
decisions on the merits, of which 82 were reported as sustained 
protests.76  But a count of actual decisions (counting each 
decision as one, even if it resolves two or more B numbers) 
reveals that there were actually 282 decisions on the merits, 
rather than 441, and that of these only 45 decisions sustained 
the 82 protests that the GAO reported as having been sustained.77  
                                                          
73 See, e.g., GAO FY 2011 BID PROTEST REPORT, supra note 54, at 4. 
74 See GAO BID PROTEST OVERVIEW, supra note 72, at 2. 
75 See BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS, supra note 44, at 5 
n.8.  
76 GAO BID PROTEST OVERVIEW, supra note 71, at 2. 
77 A note on the methodology used: A Westlaw search for GAO 
decisions issued with the terms “Matter of” and “protest” 
between October 1, 2009, and September 30, 2010, produced 310 
results.  Sixteen of those were decisions on requests for 
reconsideration or on cost claims, leaving 294 protest 
decisions.  Twelve of those were published dismissals of 
protests, leaving 282 decisions sustaining or denying protests.  
Finally, only 45 of these decisions resulted in the sustaining 
of the underlying protest or protests at issue, which accounted 
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That represents a 16% sustain rate, rather than the 19% rate 
that the GAO reported.78 
Thus far, this analysis means that, among the hundreds of 
thousands of federal procurements that occurred in FY 2010, 
there were only 45 procurements for which the GAO sustained bid 
protests.79  The next stage, though, offers even worse news for 
protesters, and it is surprising how little is reported about 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
for the overall 82 sustained protests reported by the GAO in its 
bid protest overview report of 2011.  See id.   
78 See id. 
79 The 45 figure slightly overstates the number of procurements 
that were actually successfully protested.  In one instance, the 
GAO issued two decisions on the same day sustaining two 
different companies’ protests of the same contract.  See 
McCarthy/Hunt, JV, B-402229.2, 2010 CPD ¶ 68 (Comp. Gen. Feb. 
16, 2010); B.L. Harbert-Brasfield & Gorrie, JV, B-402229, 2010 
CPD ¶ 69 (Comp. Gen. Feb. 16, 2010).  In another procurement, 
the GAO sustained a protest in March 2010, and then after the 
agency took corrective action, the GAO sustained another protest 
of the same procurement.  See Shaw-Parsons Infrastructure 
Recovery Consultants, LLC, B-401679 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 77 (Comp. 
Gen. Mar. 10, 2010) (initial decision issued in March 2010); 
Shaw-Parsons Infrastructure Recovery Consultants, LLC, B-
401679.9 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 211 (Comp. Gen. Sept. 8, 2010) 
(decision issued in September 2010 following agency corrective 
action).  In a third procurement, one firm successfully 
protested award to another firm, but then the earlier awardee 
successfully protested award to the firm that was the prior 
protester, leading to two sustained protests in the same 
procurement.  See Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., B-401773, 2009 
CPD ¶ 229 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 10, 2009) (agency implemented 
recommendation and then made award to protester, but that award 
was successfully protester by earlier awardee in Rapiscan Sys., 
Inc., B-401773.2 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 60 (Comp. Gen. Mar. 15, 
2010)).  Consequently, then, the true number of successfully 
protested procurements could more accurately be said to be 42.  
The author, however, uses 45 in this Article, in order to track 
the 45 decisions issued by the GAO. 
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it.  What happened in those 45 procurements, after the GAO 
sustained the protests?  Did the protester that was successful 
in the GAO litigation succeed in obtaining the contract?  The 
answer: rarely.  The FY 2010 numbers have been selected here for 
further study, because enough time should have passed for final 
actions in the underlying procurements to be available.  That 
said, discovering the final action on a contract can be 
challenging, because information on what ultimately happened 
after each one of the sustained protests is not readily 
available.  Enough is known, however, to give a fairly clear 
picture of protesters winning at the GAO but nonetheless not 
receiving the contested contracts.80  In four of the 45 
decisions, the GAO did not recommend any corrective action in 
the protested procurement, either because the contract had 
already been performed or for other reasons.81  In an additional 
three decisions, the GAO did recommend corrective action in the 
procurement, but the agency declined to follow the GAO’s 
                                                          
80 The GAO does not track information on which company ultimately 
receives a contract after the GAO has sustained a protest.  The 
author, working with student research assistants at The George 
Washington University Law School, has endeavored to obtain 
information for the post-protest outcome of each of the  
procurements in which the GAO sustained protests in FY 2010, and 
the results to date are set out in the text here.  The effort to 
track down every case continues through Freedom of Information 
Act requests to the respective agencies. 
81 See infra Appendix A (decisions A1-A4).  
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recommendation.82  In 23 additional decisions, the GAO 
recommended corrective action and the agency followed the GAO’s 
recommendation, but the agency then confirmed award to the same 
company as before or took some other action that did not award 
to the protester, such as awarding to a third company or 
cancelling the requirement entirely.83  In only eight cases 
identified to date did the protester apparently obtain the 
contested contract,84 and in one additional case, the agency did 
commit to resoliciting using the size standard sought by the 
protester.85  While the ultimate outcome has yet to be determined 
in the procurements covered by the remaining six decisions,86 
this much is clear: winning a protest is far from ensuring that 
a protester will win the contract that it seeks. 
                                                          
82 See infra Appendix A (decisions A5-A7); see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-211SP, GAO’S BID PROTEST ANNUAL REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 1 (2010).  GAO’s Bid Protest Annual 
Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 2012 identified 18 
protests where the agency declined to follow GAO’s 
recommendation.  GAO FY 2012 BID PROTEST REPORT, supra note 51, at 
1. 
83 See infra Appendix B (decisions B1-B23). 
84 See infra Appendix C (decisions C1-C8).   
85 In the additional case noted, listed in the appendix under C9, 
the protester had challenged the agency’s refusal to amend the 
solicitation to use a small business size standard called for by 
the Small Business Administration’s Office of Hearings and 
Appeals; in sustaining the protest, the GAO recommended that the 
agency amend the solicitation to conform to that size standard.  
Eagle Home Med. Corp., B-402387, 2010 CPD ¶ 82 (Comp. Gen. Mar. 
29, 2010).  
86 See infra Appendix D (decisions D1-D6). 
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Experienced practitioners may point out that the GAO 
reports a high “effectiveness rate,” which would suggest that 
the picture is far better than this for protesters.87  That 
“effectiveness rate,” which was reported as 42% for FYs 2010, 
2011, and 2012,88 combines the sustained protests described above 
as well as cases where agencies took voluntary “corrective 
action,” without action by the GAO, so that the GAO closed its 
files without issuing a decision.89  There is no publicly 
available information on that large universe of protests where 
the GAO was told that the protester “obtain[ed] some form of 
relief,” as the GAO writes in a footnote to FY 2012 annual 
report.90  In particular, there is no way to know whether the 
protesters ultimately obtained the contracts at issue, and 
discovering the outcome in each of the affected procurements 
would challenge even the most diligent researchers because, as 
far as the author knows, the GAO does not publicly disclose any 
information about the cases that it closes due to agencies’ 
voluntary corrective action.91  There is, however, no obvious 
                                                          
87 See generally GAO FY 2012 BID PROTEST REPORT, supra note 51, at 5 
(noting the “effectiveness rate” for FY 2012). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 5 n.4. 
90 Id. 
91 For example, in the GAO’s most recent Performance 
Accountability report, the GAO notes that it did not issue 
formal decisions because the agencies took voluntary corrective 
action.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-2SP, PERFORMANCE AND 
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reason that an agency would be more likely to award a contract 
to a protester whose case ends without a GAO decision than after 
the GAO rules in a protester’s favor. 
V. Costs of the Bid Protest Process 
Protests impose litigation costs on the parties, including 
attorney costs, although the author is unaware of data regarding 
those costs.  Moreover, even when a bid protest is denied, it 
usually holds up the protested acquisition.  Specifically, when 
a protester files in time to trigger the automatic stay under 
CICA, the agency must hold off on awarding the contract at issue 
(for pre-award protests) or direct the awardee to stop work (for 
post-award protests).92  The automatic stay for protests filed 
with the GAO can last up to 100 days,93 which is generally longer 
than the period of time other jurisdictions worldwide allow for 
their bid protest processes.94  Even if the GAO dismisses a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2012 46 (2012).  The GAO does not, 
however, discuss what action was taken.  See id. 
92 31 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2006).  
93 Id. § 3554(a)(1). 
94 See generally GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: AN OVERVIEW 
OF REGULATION IN 40 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE (Hans-Joachim Prieß et al. 
eds., 2012) (discussing bid protests processes in various 
countries worldwide).  As examples, in France, where contracts 
may not be awarded until the conclusion of a “standstill” 
provision, an administrative judge has only 20 days from the 
conclusion of the standstill period to decide, id. at 106, 
Ghana’s administrative authority is given 21 days to decide 
complaints, id. at 123, Macedonia’s Appeals Commission must 
decide cases within 15 days of receiving documentation, id. at 
175, Portugal’s administrative review takes about 3 weeks, id. 
 
 27 
 
protest, the dismissal can take several weeks, and even the most 
promptly dismissed protests may trigger a CICA stay that is in 
place for at least a few days.95  In short, the CICA stay does 
disrupt procurements. 
However, the CICA stay applies only to a small percentage 
of all federal procurements.  As discussed above, in FY 2011, 
approximately 1,470 procurements were protested to the GAO.96  
While specific information is not publicly available, it is 
likely that not all of these 1,470 protested procurements would 
have been stayed, given that only protests filed within 
specified deadlines trigger a CICA stay.97  At least some of 
these 1,470 protests were untimely filed for GAO protest 
purposes, so that they were dismissed (indeed, timeliness is one 
of the GAO’s most common bases for dismissing protests98) and 
even some of the protests that were timely filed may have been 
filed too late to trigger a CICA stay.99  For example, a protest 
filed six to ten days after a debriefing will usually be found 
timely for the GAO’s filing purposes, but it will not trigger a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
at 209, and Ukraine’s administrative review must be completed 
within 30 working days of receipt of a complaint, id. at 247. 
95 See BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS, supra note 44, at 4. 
96 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
97 See 31 U.S.C. § 3553(d)(4). 
98 See Daniel I. Gordon, Dismissals of Bid Protests at the 
General Accounting Office, PROCUREMENT LAW., Winter 2002, at 15, 
16. 
99 See 31 U.S.C. § 3553(d)(4). 
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CICA stay, because a protest must be filed within five days of a 
debriefing to trigger a stay.100 
Moreover, the fact that a protest has triggered a CICA stay 
does not mean that the procurement will be on hold for 100 days.  
Most protests are resolved well before the 100th day, which is 
the maximum length of time the GAO has for resolving a 
protest.101  In 2009, the GAO reported to Congress that it 
“consistently closed more than half of all [Department of 
Defense (DoD)] protests within 30 days.”102  While that report 
related to protests of DoD procurements,103 there is no reason to 
believe that protests of civilian agencies’ procurements (which 
are fewer in number than DoD protests104) take longer for the GAO 
to close.105  A CICA stay may end because the protester has 
withdrawn the protest, or because the GAO has dismissed the 
case.106  When an agency takes corrective action, that also ends 
the stay, but, of course, the corrective action itself will 
                                                          
100 See id. § 3553(d)(4)(B) (noting that a protest must be filed 
within five days of a requested and required debriefing in order 
to trigger a CICA stay); 4 C.F.R. § 21.2(a)(2) (2012) (noting 
that a protest must be filed within ten days of requested and 
required debriefing in order to be timely at the GAO). 
101 31 U.S.C. § 3554(a)(1) (requiring the GAO to resolve protests 
within 100 days after they are filed); BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE 
PROCUREMENTS, supra note 44, at 5. 
102 BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS, supra note 44, at 10. 
103 Id. at 5 n.7. 
104 See id. at 7.  
105 See id. at 5 n.7. 
106 Id. at 4, 10. 
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generally delay progress in the procurement.107  Even for the 
minority of protests that make it to the published decision 
stage, the GAO has reported that, on average, it issues a 
decision within 80 days.108 
Not only is the delay caused by the CICA stay shorter than 
it may appear, when a delay, even a relatively short one, could 
cause harm, CICA provides a mechanism for agencies to move 
forward with protested procurements while protests remain 
pending.109  This “override” mechanism is available to agencies 
and is used, although information on the frequency of overrides 
is not readily available.110 
Truly long procurement delays lasting for months really 
only occur when the GAO issues a decision sustaining a protest 
and the agency implements the GAO’s recommendation, which 
typically calls for the agency to re-do at least part of the 
                                                          
107 MOSHE SCHWARTZ & KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40227, GAO BID 
PROTESTS: TRENDS, ANALYSIS, AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 10 (2011). 
108 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-208R, GAO BID PROTEST 
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 2 (2005).  The 
citation refers to information for 2004; subsequent reports have 
not reported this information. 
109 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3553(c)(2), (d)(3)(C) (2006) (authorizing 
the head of a procuring activity to override the automatic CICA 
stay in specified circumstances). 
110 For FY 2002, the last year that the GAO included information 
on overrides in its annual report on protests, the GAO reported 
that, with respect to the 1,101 protests filed that year, there 
were 65  instances of agencies’ using their override authority 
to move forward with the procurement, notwithstanding the 
protest.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-427R, BID PROTEST 
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002 3, 4 (2003). 
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competition for the contract.111  The universe of such cases, 
however, is quite small: as explained above, there are only a 
few dozen sustained protests in a year (as noted above, there 
were 45 decisions in which the GAO sustained protests in FY 
2010),112 and, of those, some do not lead to delay in the 
procurement after the GAO has issued its decision, either 
because the decision did not contain a recommendation for 
corrective action or because the agency declined to follow the 
GAO’s recommendation.113  That leaves a relatively small number 
of procurements, which the author estimates is certainly fewer 
than 40 out of the 200,000 procurements per year estimate used 
in this Article, in which there is any substantial delay due to 
a successful protest.114   
Finally, in the author’s view, there is adequate 
justification for a substantial delay in a procurement where the 
GAO has determined that the agency violated procurement law, and 
that the violation has harmed the protester.  At the very least, 
any delay that such an agency’s unlawful action has caused 
should not be blamed on the bid protest system. 
Critics of the protest system may also view the GAO’s 
authority to recommend that successful protesters be reimbursed 
                                                          
111 See 31 U.S.C. § 3554(b)(1)(B). 
112 See discussion supra Part IV.B.   
113 See discussion supra Part IV.B.   
114 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
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the costs of filing and pursuing their protests, including costs 
attributable to attorneys’ fees, as another cost of associated 
with bid protests.115  This situation arises only when the GAO 
finds that a protest is clearly meritorious, which means that 
the contracting agency violated procurement law to the detriment 
of the protester, and when the agency has unduly delayed taking 
corrective action.116  In the author’s view, reimbursing 
protesters for their actions as “private attorneys general” is 
justifiable.117  In any event, the reimbursable rates for 
attorneys’ fees in those situations are now capped, except for 
small business protesters.118 
That said, critics point to abuse of the protest system in 
particular contexts as causes for concern.  Specifically, there 
                                                          
115 See generally 31 U.S.C. § 3554(c)(1)(A)-(B) (permitting the 
Comptroller General to recommend that the procuring agency pay 
successful protesters’ protest related fees). 
116 See, e.g., Advanced Envtl. Solutions, Inc.—Costs, B-296136.2, 
2005 CPD ¶ 121, at 2-3 (Comp. Gen. June 20, 2005) (noting that 
protest costs may be awarded where an agency unduly delayed 
taking corrective action on a meritorious protest); Takota 
Corp.—Costs, B-299600.2, 2007 CPD ¶ 171, at 3 (Com. Gen. Sept. 
18,2007) (finding no need to award attorney fees because Coast 
Guard complied with regulations by swiftly taking corrective 
actions). 
117 See generally Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 
864 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (describing the role of “private attorneys 
general in monitoring compliance with federal procurement law). 
118 31 U.S.C. § 3554(c)(2).  Under CICA, only small businesses 
may be reimbursed attorneys’ fees at a rate over $150 dollars 
per hour unless the contracting agency and the GAO find that a 
higher reimbursement of attorneys’ fees at a higher rate is 
warranted.  Id. 
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are persistent complaints that abuse arises in the form of 
“frivolous” protests, and the author has often heard calls for 
imposing sanctions on firms that file frivolous protests.119  In 
the 2009 report to Congress on DoD procurements, the GAO 
responded to a request from the House Armed Services Committee 
to address frivolous protests filed in connection with DoD 
procurements.120  The GAO pointed out that the fact that a 
protest is denied or even dismissed does not mean that it is 
frivolous; instead, the GAO expressed the view that only a 
protest filed in bad faith should be viewed as frivolous.121  In 
any event, the GAO reported that it did not “categorize protests 
as frivolous,” and therefore it had no data on the number of 
frivolous protests filed.122  It did point out, however, that 
contracting agencies rarely assert that protests are 
frivolous.123  In a footnote, the GAO indicated that the last 
reported decision noting that an agency had characterized a 
protest as frivolous was issued in 1996, and that in that case, 
                                                          
119 See Metzger & Lyons, supra note 14, at 1240-41; Jonathan R. 
Cantor, Note, Bid Protests and Procurement Reform: The Case for 
Leaving Well Enough Alone, 27 PUB. CONT. L.J. 155, 172 (1997) 
(recounting proposed regulations aimed at preventing “frivolous” 
protests). 
120 BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS, supra note 44, at 11-15. 
121 Id. at 11-12. 
122 Id. at 12. 
123 Id. at 12 n.13. 
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the agency subsequently acknowledged that the evaluation scheme 
used in the protested procurement was flawed.124 
In its 2009 report, the GAO asserted that its practice of 
promptly dismissing protests indicated that there was no problem 
with frivolous protests.125  The GAO also expressed concern that 
any effort to impose sanctions on frivolous protests (such as 
imposing a fine or requiring the protester to reimburse the 
Government for costs incurred in defending against the protest) 
would risk “the unintended consequence of discouraging 
participation in federal contracting and, in turn, limiting 
competition.”126  The GAO also pointed out that penalties could 
not properly be imposed on “frivolous” protesters without adding 
a new layer of litigation, for which the GAO would then need to 
determine whether protesters had filed their protests in bad 
faith.127  Besides the burden that such litigation would place on 
the GAO, distracting it from its focus on resolving protests as 
quickly as possible, a new layer of litigation could impose 
additional costs on agencies and protesters, the burden for 
which might fall disproportionately heavily on small businesses 
and protesters not represented by counsel that may have 
                                                          
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 2. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 13. 
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protested in good faith but acted with a misunderstanding of the 
facts or the law.128 
Those who allege that some protesters abuse the system 
sometimes point to one scenario in particular: situations where 
a service contractor has lost a competition for a follow-on 
contract and then files a protest in order to continue working 
during the period of the CICA stay.129  This concern would be 
particularly great if: (1) many protests were found to have been 
filed by service-contract incumbents that had lost competitions 
for follow-on contracts, and (2) their protests were completely 
without merit, but (3) the GAO was so slow in resolving the 
protests that the incumbent was able to continue performing well 
after its contract had been due to expire.  However, the author 
is not aware of any data suggesting that many protests meet 
these conditions.  The appropriate response, in any event, would 
appear to be to press the GAO to continue (or intensify) its 
efforts to resolve protests promptly, not to create a new round 
of litigation about the imposition of sanctions, and certainly 
                                                          
128 Id.  It is worth noting that protesters have only limited 
information about what happened during a procurement at the time 
that the strict time limits require them to decide whether to 
file a protest, because many agencies disclose to firms that 
lost competitions for contract only the bare minimum required by 
law.  See generally FAR 15.505, .506 (requiring pre-award and 
post-award de-briefings).   
129 See, e.g., Kovacic, supra note 3, at 489 (describing this 
type of criticism); Keeton Corrs., Inc. v. United States, 59 
Fed. Cl. 753, 754-55 (2007). 
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not to limit or abolish vendors’ right to have an independent 
body consider their claims of unlawful action by contracting 
agencies. 
The final category of costs often associated with the 
protest system concerns sequential protests, where a protester 
loses a protest at the GAO and then protests at the Court of 
Federal Claims.130  Presumably, the situation could be made to 
sound worse by imagining that many cases protesting procurements 
are first brought to the contracting agency, then to the GAO, 
then to the Court of Federal Claims, and finally to the Federal 
Circuit.131  This scenario is mere speculation, however, with no 
evidence that the nightmarish four-fora pattern occurs often.  
Indeed, even when it does occur, it is not clear that the 
procurement would always be disrupted, since there might be no 
CICA stay at the GAO,132 and the courts would certainly have 
                                                          
130 See Schaengold et al., supra note 60, at 318 (noting the 
possibility of sequential protests); see, e.g., Axiom Res. 
Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (where protester was unsuccessful at the GAO and then 
sought review by the Court of Federal Claims). 
131 See, e.g., Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 644, 
646-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (where a disappointed bidder protested 
to the Army, the successful bidder protested the Army’s 
corrective action to the GAO, the disappointed bidder then 
protested the GAO’s decision to the Court of Federal Claims, and 
the successful bidder appealed the Court of Federal Claims’ 
decision to the Federal Circuit).  
132 There may be no CICA stay if either the protest does not meet 
the timeliness rules for a CICA stay or if there is an agency 
override.  See FAR 33.104(b), 33.104(c)(1) (indicating the 
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discretion not to impose a preliminary injunction.133  While 
there are some protesters that start at the GAO and then go to 
the Court of Federal Claims,134 the number is apparently so 
small, and the evidence that the underlying procurements to 
these protests have been substantially delayed is so thin 
(again, there is no automatic right to a stay at the court135), 
that this cannot legitimately be seen as a significant cost of 
the bid protest system.  More importantly, the court 
occasionally reaches a different outcome than the GAO did,136 
which suggests, if nothing else, that the protest was not 
frivolous.   
Another concern about the cost of the protest system 
relates to what might be called its indirect impact.  Fear of 
protests is often given as the explanation for Contracting 
Officers’ preference for certain courses of action over 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
timeliness rules for an automatic CICA stay); 31 U.S.C. §§ 
3553(c)(2), (d)(3)(C) (2006) (permitting an agency to override 
the automatic stay in certain circumstances). 
133 See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(2) (2006) (granting the Court of 
Federal Claims jurisdiction to provide injunctive relief); Akal 
Sec., Inc. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 311, 316-17 (2009) 
(delineating the factors considered in granting injunctive 
relief).  
134 See, e.g., Analytical & Research Tech., B-276064, 97-1 CPD ¶ 
200 (Comp. Gen. May 7, 1997); Analytical & Research Tech., Inc., 
39 Fed. Cl. 34, 40 (1997). 
135 See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(2) (2006). 
136 See, e.g., Turner Constr. Co. v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 
561, 586 (2010) (holding that the Army acted improperly in 
setting aside a previously awarded contract, pursuant to the 
GAO’s recommendation). 
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others.137  In particular, Contracting Officers have told the 
author that they are acting to avoid bid protests when they 
decide that a contract should be awarded to the lowest-priced, 
technically acceptable (LPTA) proposal, rather than to allow for 
a tradeoff.138  There does not appear to be any data that would 
indicate how often Contracting Officers actually decide to make 
an award on an LPTA basis for this reason alone, nor any data on 
how often source selection officials avoid making tradeoffs in 
award decisions, even when permitted to by the terms of a 
solicitation, just to avoid protests.  If the phenomenon is 
common, it is unfortunate, since discretion to make tradeoffs is 
a positive option in the U.S. procurement system.139   
Similarly, the author has heard for many years that some 
Contracting Officers prefer to make award based on initial 
proposals, rather than to conduct discussions, because they fear 
that discussions with offerors are a legal minefield, such that 
conducting discussions will increase the likelihood of a bid 
protest and improve the protester’s chances of prevailing if a 
                                                          
137 See Myth-Busting, supra note 63, at 7 (noting that 
Contracting Officers sometimes attempt to “protest-proof” 
procurements when that should not be the overriding goal). 
138 See generally FAR 15.101-1(a) (permitting agencies to use 
tradeoff process when it would be “in the best interest of the 
Government”).  
139 See id. 
 38 
 
protest is filed.140  Again, that would represent a loss, since 
the ability to conduct discussions with offerors is a good 
feature of our acquisition system and is not often used in other 
systems around the world.141  Similar to the extent to which 
Contracting Officers use LPTA rather than tradeoff to avoid 
protest, there is a lack of data about how common it is for 
Contracting Officers to award based on initial proposals in 
order to reduce the likelihood of a successful protest.  In any 
event, the author is skeptical that there is any good reason to 
“protest-proof” an acquisition in this way, especially in light 
of how rare protests are, and how exceedingly rare successful 
protests are.142  Moreover, neither using LPTA as the basis for 
award, nor making award based on initial proposals, without 
conducting discussions, will ensure that no protest will ever be 
                                                          
140 See, e.g., Rig Masters, Inc. v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 
413, 420 (2006) (holding that the Contracting Officer’s failure 
to hold negotiations was not an abuse of discretion).  
141 See Christopher R. Yukins, Integrating Integrity and 
Procurement: The United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
and the UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law, 36 PUB. CONT. L.J. 307, 
327-28, 328 n.70 (2007) (suggesting that the United States 
preference for negotiated procurement is a strong advantage, but 
is not widely used worldwide because the U.S. enjoys relatively 
low levels of corruption); IVAR STRAND ET AL., PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN 
EUROPE: COST AND EFFECTIVENESS 7, 15 (2011) (noting that the Eurozone 
rarely uses negotiation); Shigeki Kusunoki, Japan’s Government 
Procurement Regimes for Public Works: A Comparative 
Introduction, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 523, 528 (2006) (noting that, 
historically, negotiated procurements were rarely used in 
Japan). 
142 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
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held, as GAO and Court of Federal Claims decisions ruling on 
protests of LPTA awards and initial-proposal awards 
demonstrate.143  That said, it must be recognized that in both 
areas, and potentially in others as well, it is quite possible 
that the fear of protests, whether justifiable or not, is 
harming the acquisition system by driving bad decisions by 
federal contracting personnel.  To mitigate this harm, efforts 
should be made to improve Contracting Officers’ knowledge about 
the rarity of protests and the fact that making LPTA awards or 
awards based on initial proposals will not prevent protests, as 
well as the benefit to the Government of using tradeoffs and 
discussions as means to obtain a better deal for taxpayers.   
VI. Benefits of the Protest Process 
As noted above, countries around the world are developing 
bid protest systems, and such systems have become, or are fast 
becoming, part of the norm for good government in the 
acquisition arena.144  That can be attributed to several benefits 
associated with bid protests. 
First, protests introduce a relatively low-cost form of 
accountability into acquisition systems by providing disgruntled 
                                                          
143 See, e.g., Guzar Mirbachakot Transp. v. United States, 104 
Fed. Cl. 53 (2012) (lowest price, technically acceptable (LPTA) 
case at the CoFC); Ahtna Facility Servs., Inc., B-404913 et al., 
2011 CPD ¶ 134 (Comp. Gen. June 30, 2011) (LPTA case at the 
GAO).   
144 See discussion supra Part III. 
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participants a forum for airing their complaints.145  Protesting 
firms decide which procurements are to be investigated: if no 
one protests, then neither the GAO nor the Court of Federal 
Claims would look into a procurement, but if someone does 
protest, then the GAO and the court would consider the 
procurement if the protest passes procedural hurdles, such as 
timeliness.146  While reliance on audits by government officials 
would also inject accountability into the workings of 
procurement systems, it may be more efficient to focus on 
procurements where a participant is dissatisfied by a government 
agency’s conduct; that is what the “private attorney general” 
model of a protest provides.147  In blunt terms, if no one is 
                                                          
145 See Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental 
Failure of Businesslike Government, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 627, 681 
(2001) (contending that “[i]n economic terms, the protest and 
dispute regimes are a bargain” and that “[o]pponents of 
litigation are hard pressed to demonstrate a more cost 
effective, less intrusive compliance regime.”). 
146 See 31 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (conferring jurisdiction on 
the GAO to review procurements protested by an interested 
party); id. § 3551(2) (defining “interested party” as “an actual 
or prospective bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest 
would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to 
award the contract” or an agency official or agent representing 
federal employees who stand to be injured by private 
competition); 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) (2006) (granting the Court 
of Federal Claims jurisdiction to hear claims brought by 
“interested parties”); R. CT. FED. CL. (procedural rules governing 
the Court of Federal Claims); 4 C.F.R. §§ 21.1, .2 (2012) 
(procedural rules governing bid protests at the GAO). 
147 See Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 864 (D.C. 
Cir. 1970) (“The public interest in preventing the granting of 
contracts through arbitrary or capricious action can properly be 
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dissatisfied with the way the Government conducted a 
procurement, then it may not be a wise use of auditors’ time to 
investigate it.148 
Second, by being directly responsive to participants’ 
complaints, protests can increase potential bidders’ confidence 
in the integrity of the procurement process, and thereby lead 
more players to participate, thus increasing competition.149  
Increasing competition, in turn, can translate into bidders 
offering lower prices, higher quality, or both, to contracting 
agencies.150 
Third, protests can increase the public’s confidence in the 
integrity of the public procurement process.  While the public 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
vindicated through a suit brought by one who suffers injury as a 
result of the illegal activity, but the suit itself is brought 
in the public interest by one acting essentially as a ‘private 
attorney general.’”); Schooner, supra note 145, at 630, 680-84 
(arguing that “private attorneys general” litigation is a public 
good). 
148 It should, though, be noted that in situations where all the 
bidders are colluding, none may have an interest in protesting, 
so that the protest system would not provide accountability in 
that case.  Indeed, if anything, in those situations protests 
may serve as a means for colluding bidders to police their 
collusive agreement.  See Kovacic, supra note 3, at 490-91. 
149 See generally Steven L. Schooner, Desiderata: Objectives for 
a System of Government Contract Law, 11 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 103 
(2002) [hereinafter Desiderata] (discussing the goals of a 
procurement system, including competition). 
150 See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Rumsfeld, 262 F.3d 649, 657 
(7th Cir. 2001) (noting that CICA, by requiring full and open 
competition, was intended to “save money, curb cost growth, 
promote innovation and the development of high quality 
technology” (quoting Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., Local 219 v. 
Cohen, 171 F.3d 460, 472 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
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only rarely focuses on public contracting, having a protest 
process mentioned in the press – as happened when The Boeing 
Company successfully protested the Air Force’s award of a tanker 
contract to Northrop Grumman151 - may raise the public’s trust in 
the fairness of the Government’s acquisition system and the way 
it spends taxpayer funds. 
Fourth, because protests are a known avenue for complaints, 
their availability empowers those in contracting agencies who 
face pressure to act improperly.  Thus, if a Contracting Officer 
were to be pressed by users within an agency to award a sole-
source contract to a favored firm, the Contracting Officer, who 
may lack the bureaucratic clout to resist the pressure, could 
point to the risk of a successful protest as one additional 
reason to follow the statutory and regulatory requirements for 
competition.152 
Fifth, protest decisions, because they are public, and have 
been released publicly since the GAO issued the first one in 
1926,153 provide a high level of transparency into what is 
                                                          
151 See Boeing Co., B-311344 et al., 2008 CPD ¶ 114 (Comp. Gen. 
June 18, 2008); Leslie Wayne, Audit Says Tanker Deal Is Flawed, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2008, at C1. 
152 See generally Vernon J. Edwards & Ralph C. Nash, Jr., 
Postcript II: The Role of the Contracting Officer, 24 NASH & 
CIBINIC REP. ¶ 15 (discussing pressures that Contracting Officers 
routinely face). 
153 See Autocar Sales & Serv. Co., 5 Comp. Gen. 712 (1926). 
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happening in the federal procurement system.154  While, in 
theory, databases such as the Federal Procurement Data System 
(FPDS) should provide transparency into the system,155 protest 
decisions can often provide more useful information than 
databases.  This is particularly the case where protests 
demonstrate how problematic certain issues are.  For example, 
when the GAO sustained a significant number of protests 
challenging the way agencies were conducting public/private 
competitions under OMB Circular A-76 in the 1990s, the 
importance of improving the way those competitions were 
                                                          
154 See generally Desiderata, supra note 149 (describing 
transparency as a goal of an effective procurement system). 
155 The Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) was created by the 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) in response to a 
congressional requirement in the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy Act that the OFPP “establish[] a system for collecting, 
developing, and disseminating procurement data which takes into 
account the needs of the Congress, the executive branch, and the 
private sector.”  Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, Pub. 
L. No. 93-400, § 6, 88 Stat. 796, 798 (1974) (codified at 41 
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1131 (Supp. IV 2010)); see also FAR 4.602 
(describing the FPDS); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-960R, 
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO THE FEDERAL PROCUREMENT DATA SYSTEM-NEXT GENERATION 1-2 
(2005) [hereinafter IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO THE FEDERAL PROCUREMENT DATA 
SYSTEM].  Although the FPDS is meant to provide transparency in 
federal contracting by enabling the public and members of the 
Government to access accurate data about government 
procurements, the accuracy and timeliness of the data in the 
FPDS have been criticized.  See IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO THE FEDERAL 
PROCUREMENT DATA SYSTEM, supra, at 2-5; Letter from Sen. John F. 
Kerry, U.S. Senator, to Robert A. Burton, Assoc. Adm’r of the 
Office of Fed. Procurement Policy (Nov. 14, 2005), available at 
http://asbl.com/asbl.resource/content/supdoc/kerry_letter.pdf 
(noting several limitations of the Federal Procurement Data 
System that hinder transparency). 
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conducted was highlighted, and the decisions ultimately led to 
revisions to the Circular as well as the creation of the 
congressionally-chartered Commercial Activities Panel.156  
Similarly, it was the GAO sustaining of a number of protests 
alleging organizational conflicts of interest that focused 
attention on this area and may have led to congressional and 
regulatory action.157 
Finally, the fact that protest decisions are published and 
widely read by practitioners brings an additional benefit: the 
decisions provide guidance, particularly to agency counsel and 
attorneys representing potential protesters, as well as to their 
                                                          
156 Following a number of the GAO bid protest decisions arising 
from public/private competitions under OMB Circular A-76, the 
Congress created the Commercial Activities Panel through the 
Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2001.  See Pub. L. No. 106-398, § 832, 114 Stat. 1654, 
1654A-221 (2000); COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PANEL, IMPROVING THE SOURCING 
DECISIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT: FINAL REPORT 90-99 (2002) (summarizing GAO 
protest decisions arising from public/private competitions under 
OMB Circular A-76).  The Panel recommended a number of changes, 
many of which were adopted in the 2003 revision of OMB Circular 
A-76.  COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PANEL, IMPROVING THE SOURCING DECISIONS OF THE 
GOVERNMENT 51-52 ((2002). 
157 See Daniel I. Gordon, Organizational Conflicts of Interest: A 
Growing Integrity Challenge, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 25, 32-41 (2005) 
(discussing organizational conflict of interest bid protests).  
Section 207 of the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 
2009 (WSARA) called for tightening of the rules governing 
organizational conflicts of interest (OCIs).  See Pub. L. No. 
111-23, § 207, 123 Stat. 1704, 1728.  As of the time of this 
writing, a proposed rule is being considered to revise the FAR 
provisions on OCIs.  FAR Case 2011-001, Federal Acquisition 
Regulation: Organizational Conflicts of Interest, 76 Fed. Reg. 
23,236 (proposed Apr. 26, 2011) (proposed rule) (to be codified 
at FAR pts. 2-4, 7, 9, 11-16, 18, 37, 42, 52-53). 
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clients.  To give just one example that has been true for 
decades: any corporate counsel who follows GAO bid protest 
decisions knows how strictly the GAO applies the “late is late” 
rule,158 so that counsel will ensure that their client 
appreciates the importance of submitting bids on time. 
VII. Conclusion: The Costs of the Bid Protest System are 
Overstated, and the System’s Benefits Outweigh Them 
As explained above, the costs that bid protests impose on 
the acquisition system are often misunderstood and therefore 
overstated, in terms of the frequency of protests, the length of 
time that they last, and the risk that an agency’s choice of 
contractor will be overturned in the process.  Moreover, the 
benefits of the protest system may not be fully appreciated, as 
is the fact that the United States is required by its 
international trade agreements to have a protest system.  
Whatever costs protests impose on the procurement system are 
outweighed, at least in the author’s view, by the benefits that 
protests bring, in terms of transparency, accountability, 
education, and protection of the integrity of the U.S. federal 
acquisition system. 
                                                          
158 See Gregg A. Engler, Limiting Application of the Late 
Proposal Rule: One Time, One Place, One Method, ARMY LAW., Oct. 
2003, at 15.  See generally FAR 15.208(b)(1) (providing that 
proposals, modifications, and revisions are considered “late” if 
received after the time specified). 
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Appendix A: Agency Did Not Redo the Protest Procurement 
 
 
 Agency Declined to Follow GAO’s Recommendation160 
A5 Rice Servs., Inc., B-403746, 2010 CPD ¶ 220 (Comp. 
Gen. Sept. 16, 2010). 
A6 Rice Servs., Inc., B-402966.2, 2010 CPD ¶ 217 (Comp. 
Gen. Sept. 16, 2010). 
A7 DGR Assocs., Inc., B-402494, 2010 CPD ¶ 115 (Comp. 
Gen. May 14, 2010). 
 
                                                          
159 Note that A3 and A4 involved protests of public-private 
competitions, where the federal employees’ representative won 
the protest and may have been satisfied that no further 
competition would be held. 
160 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-211SP, GAO’S BID PROTEST 
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 1 (2010). 
 GAO Did Not Recommend that the Agency Redo the 
Procurement159 
A1 Biblia, Inc., B-403006, 2010 CPD ¶ 203 (Comp. Gen. 
Sept. 13, 2010) (protested work completed prior to 
issuance of GAO decision). 
A2 RBC Bearings Inc., B-401661 et al., 2009 CPD ¶ 207 
(Comp. Gen. Oct. 27, 2009) (agency had overridden the 
stay and made award notwithstanding the protest). 
A3 Bruce Bancroft—Agency Tender Official, B-400404.7 et 
al., 2010 CPD ¶ 9 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 17, 2009). 
A4 Frank A. Bloomer—Agency Tender Official, B-401482.2 
et al., 2009 CPD ¶ 203 (Comp. Gen. Oct. 19, 2009). 
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Appendix B: Agency Took Corrective Action, but Protester did not 
get the Protested Contract 
B1 Analysis Grp., LLC, B-401726 et al., 2009 CPD ¶ 237 
(Comp. Gen. Nov. 13, 2009); Analysis Grp., LLC, B-
401726.3, 2011 CPD ¶ 166 (Comp. Gen. Apr. 18, 2011) 
(denying protest of agency’s implementation of the 
GAO’s recommendation in the earlier, sustained 
protest, where the agency’s implementation led it to 
confirm award to the original awardee). 
B2 Port of Bellingham, B-401837, 2009 CPD ¶ 245 (Comp. 
Gen. Dec. 2, 2009); Press Release, Port of Newport, 
Port Commission Briefed on Construction Progress for 
International Terminal Renovation and NOAA MOC-P 
Projects (Sept. 29, 2010). 
B3 Navistar Def., LLC, B-401865 et al., 2009 CPD ¶ 258 
(Comp. Gen. Dec. 14, 2009); FMTV 2010-2015: Pyrrhic 
Victories?  Oshkosh Wins the Re-Compete, DEF. INDUS. 
DAILY (Apr. 16, 2012), 
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/FMTV-2010-2015-
Oshkosh-Wins-The-Re-Compete-05744#US-Army-vehicles. 
B4 Velos, Inc., B-400500.8 et al., 2009 CPD ¶ 13 (Comp. 
Gen. Dec. 14, 2009); Velos, Inc., B-400500.11 (Comp. 
Gen. May 26, 2011) (unpublished decision) (on file 
with author). 
B5 Coastal Env’ts, Inc., B-401889, 2009 CPD ¶ 261 (Comp. 
Gen. Dec. 18, 2009); Letter from Linda M. Fredendall, 
Contracting Officer, Dep’t of the Army, to Victor 
Palma, Ecological Communications Corporation (Feb. 
15, 2010) (reaffirming award to original awardee) (on 
file with author). 
B6 C&B Constr., Inc., B-401988.2, 2010 CPD ¶ 1 (Comp. 
Gen. Jan. 6, 2010); Letter from Cynthia B. Armour, 
Contracting Officer, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., to Mike 
Herrick & Justin Isle, Aquatic Contracting (May 25, 
2010) (on file with author) (awardee’s task order 
terminated, with work expected to be added to a 
future task order). 
B7 McKissack+Delcan JV II, B-401973.2 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 
28 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 13, 2010); Letter from Carolyn A. 
Horne, Contracting Officer, Fed. Transit Admin., to 
Brian Stearman, McKissack & Delcan Joint Venture II 
 48 
 
(June 4, 2010) (on file with author) (exclusion of 
protester’s proposal confirmed). 
B8 Gen. Dynamics One Source, LLC, B-400340.5 et al., 
2010 CPD ¶ 45 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 20, 2010); Unisys 
Corp., B-400340.9 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 171 (Comp. Gen. 
July 27, 2010) (denying protest after agency 
implemented the GAO’s recommendation, but still made 
award to the original awardee). 
B9 Cahaba Safeguard Adm’rs, LLC, B-401842.2, 2010 CPD ¶ 
39 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 25, 2010); C2C Solutions, Inc., 
B-401106.6, 2010 CPD ¶ 145, at 5 n.5 (Comp. Gen. June 
21, 2010) (denying protest of the way agency 
implemented the GAO’s recommended corrective action 
in sustained protests - both in Cahaba and C2C, infra 
B10 - where the effect of the agency’s method 
apparently allowed the original awardee to keep the 
protested contract). 
B10 C2C Solutions, Inc., B-401106.5, 2010 CPD ¶ 38 (Comp. 
Gen. Jan. 25, 2010); C2C Solutions, Inc., B-401106.5 
et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 145 (Comp. Gen. June 12, 2010) 
(denying protest of the way agency implemented the 
GAO’s recommended corrective action in sustained 
protests –both in C2C and Cahaba, supra B9 – where 
the effect of the agency’s method apparently allowed 
the original awardee to keep the protested contract). 
B11 McCarthy/Hunt, JV, B-402229.2, 2010 CPD ¶ 68 (Comp. 
Gen. Feb. 16, 2010); Turner Constr. Co. v. United 
States, 94 Fed. Cl. 561, 586 (2010), aff’d 645 F.3d 
1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (rejecting the GAO’s analysis 
and effectively reinstating award to the original 
awardee). 
B12 B.L. Harbert-Brasfield & Gorrie, JV, B-402229, 2010 
CPD ¶ 69 (Comp. Gen. Feb. 16, 2010) (a separate 
decision on the same procurement as McCarthy/Hunt, 
supra B11, and also effectively reversed through the 
courts’ decisions in Turner Constr. Co., supra B11). 
B13 Med. Dev. Int’l, Inc., B-402198.2, 2010 CPD ¶ 185 
(Comp. Gen. Mar. 29, 2010); Comprehensive Medical 
Services – FCC Terre Haute, FEDBIZOPPS (June 8, 2011),  
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab
=core&id=7f95e6ef952104fd783510846ce50d17 (corrective 
action resulted in award to original awardee). 
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B14 J2A 2 JV, LLC, B-401663.4, 2010 CPD ¶ 102 (Comp. Gen. 
Apr. 19, 2010), Y-Sarasota National Cemetery Phase 1B 
Development Sarasota, Florida, FEDBIZOPPS (Dec. 23, 
2010), 
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=
0aba165105ae9b45415bd9f0c7bb1a55&tab=core&_cview=1 
(indicating that the agency apparently issued a new 
solicitation and awarded contracts to two companies, 
neither the protester nor the awardee). 
B15 Contrack Int’l, Inc., B-401871.5 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 
126 (Comp. Gen. May 24, 2010); Memorandum from Dir., 
Joint Eng’r Directorate, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, to 
the U.S. Forces Army Cent. (USARCENT), Kuwait G7 
(Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with author) (solicitation 
cancelled). 
B16 JER 370 Third St., LLC, B-402025 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 
120 (Comp. Gen. June 1, 2010); U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., 
U.S. GOV’T LEASE FOR REAL PROPERTY, LEASE NO. GS-09B-GS-09B-
02312 (June 1, 2011) (on file with author) (contract 
awarded to different offeror). 
B17 Wackenhut Servs., Inc., B-402550.2, 2010 CPD ¶ 204 
(Comp. Gen. June 7, 2010); Armed Guard Service – DEA 
HQ and Labs VA and MD, FEDBIZOPPS (Apr. 28, 2011),  
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab
=core&id=b238d4ac2f13cecf300586b571e630e7&_cview=0 
(corrective action resulted in award to original 
awardee). 
B18 MPRI, Div. of L-3 Servs., Inc., B-402548 et al.,  
2010 CPD ¶ 108 (Comp. Gen. June 4, 2010); Contract 
Actions Matching “w91crb09r0009,” FPDS.GOV, 
https://www.fpds.gov/dbsight/search.do?indexName=awar
dfull&templateName=1.4.4&s=FPDSNG.COM&q=w91crb09r0009 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2012) (award remained with 
original awardee). 
B19 Sys. Eng’g Int’l, Inc, B-402754, 2010 CPD ¶ 167 
(Comp. Gen. July 20, 2010); Contract No. EP10HO1229, 
Modification No. 0003, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency 
(Nov. 2, 2011) (on file with author). 
B20 DRS ICAS, LLC, B-401852.4 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 261 
(Comp. Gen. Sept. 8, 2010). 
B21 Info. Ventures, Inc., B-403321, 2010 CPD ¶ 223 (Comp. 
Gen. Sept. 27, 2010); Mission Support Services for 
Preparation of Toxicological Profiles, FEDBIZOPPS (Nov. 
19, 2010), https://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity& 
mode=form&id=a3e74cdbe8ae50d896268cb7559b0f65&tab=cor
re&_cview=1 (solicitation cancelled Nov. 19, 2010). 
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B22 Shaw-Parson Infrastructure Recovery Consultants, B-
401679 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 77 (Comp. Gen. Mar. 10, 
2010); Parsons Infrastructure Recovery Consultants, 
LLC, B-401679.8 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 2100 (Comp. Gen. 
Sept. 8, 2010) (stating that the agency implemented 
the GAO’s recommendation, but selected the same firms 
for award as earlier). 
B23 Shaw-Parsons Infrastructure Recovery Consultants, 
LLC, B-401679.8 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 211(Comp. Gen. 
Sept. 8, 2010) (challenging the reevaluation of the 
procurement pursuant to the Shaw-Parson decision, 
supra B22); Public Assistance Technical Assitance 
Contract (PA TAC III), FEDBIZOPPS (June 15, 2009), 
https://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=08fce
ab6b86734c234917a77eda5a564&tab=core&_cview=1. 
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Appendix C: Agency Took Corrective Action, and Protester 
Obtained either the Protested Contract or the Specific Relief 
Requested 
C1 AINS, Inc., B-400760 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 32 (Comp. 
Gen. Jan. 19, 2010) (sustaining protested award of a 
single blanket purchase agreement to a firm other 
than the protester); AINS, Inc., B-405902.3, 2012 CPD 
¶ 189, at 1 (Comp. Gen. May 31, 2012) (stating that 
both AINS and the other firm have blanket purchase 
agreements for what appear to be the services at 
issue in the protest). 
C2 Humana Military Healthcare Servs., B-401652.2 et al., 
2009 CPD ¶ 219 (Comp. Gen. Oct. 28, 2009) (sustaining 
protest of award to another firm); UnitedHealth 
Military & Veterans Servs., LLC, B-401652.8 et al., 
2012 CPD ¶ 83 (Comp. Gen. June 14, 2011) (denying 
protest of another firm challenging award to Humana, 
the earlier protester). 
C3 Health Net Fed. Servs., LLC, B-401652.3 et al., 2009 
CPD ¶ 220 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 4, 2009); TRICARE Third 
Generation Managed Care Support Services for the 
North Region, FEDBIZOPPS (May 18, 2010), 
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab
=core&id-2306443561cd2064ef5f946a03fb1b55 (award to 
protester). 
C4 Ewing Constr. Co., B-401887.3 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 108 
(Comp. Gen. Apr. 26, 2010); Contract No. N69450-10-C-
0789, NAVFAC Se. (Aug. 10, 2010) (on file with 
author). 
C5 AMEC Earth & Envtl., Inc., B-401961 et al., 2010 CPD 
¶ 141 (Comp. Gen. Dec. 22, 2009); Nat’l Multiple 
Award Constr. Contract Contact Information, U.S. 
Coast Guard (on file with author) (protester awarded 
one of multiple-award contracts). 
C6 Milani Constr., LLC, B-401942, 2009 CPD ¶ 87 (Comp. 
Gen. Dec. 22, 2009); Rehabilitate Anacostia Park, 
National Capital Parks East, FEDBIZOPPS (Apr. 5, 2010), 
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab
=core&id=1a5812911b516e2840156e2907c715c5&_cview=0.   
C7 Irving Burton Assocs., Inc., B-401983.3, 2010 CPD ¶ 
92 (Comp. Gen. Mar. 29, 2010) (on file with author) 
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(agency documents indicate former awardee’s task 
order terminated for convenience of the government 
and task order awarded to protester). 
C8 PMO P’ship Joint Venture, B-401973.3 et al., 2010 CPD 
¶ 29 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 14, 2010); Project Management 
Oversight, FEDBIZOPPS (Jan. 21, 2011), 
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab
=core&id=1a5812911b516e2840156e2907c715c5&_cview=0. 
C9 Eagle Home Med. Corp., B-402387, 2010 CPD ¶ 82 (Comp. 
Gen. Mar. 29, 2010) (information the author obtained 
through a Freedom of Information Act request 
indicates that the agency cancelled the solicitation 
and stated that it would resolicit using the size 
standard that the protester advocated; it is unknown 
whether protester ultimately received the contract). 
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Appendix D: Ultimate Outcome Not Yet Identified 
D1 Brican Inc., B-402602, 2010 CPD ¶ 141 (Comp. Gen. 
June 17, 2010). 
D2 Powersolv, Inc., B-402534 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 206 
(Comp. Gen. June 1, 2010). 
D3 DynCorp Int’l LLC, B-402349, 2010 CPD ¶ 59 (Comp. 
Gen. Mar. 15, 2010). 
D4 Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., B-401773, 2009 CPD ¶ 
229 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 10, 2009) (agency implemented 
recommendation and then made award to protester, 
but that award was successfully protested by 
earlier awardee in Rapiscan Sys., Inc., B-401773.2 
et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 60 (Comp. Gen. Mar. 15, 2010), 
and the ultimate outcome has not yet been 
identified. 
D5 Rapiscan Sys., Inc., B-401773.2 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 
60 (Comp. Gen. Mar. 15, 2010). 
D6 Am. Sec. Programs, Inc., B-402069 et al., 2010 CPD 
¶ 2 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 15, 2010). 
 
 
